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Abstract. In this paper, I present an outline of a paradox which is a variation on the lottery 
paradox and concerns whether we can ignore hesitant moral judgments. 
 
Someone comes up with a moral theory, such as the theory that the morally right action 
is the one that produces the most happiness. Then someone else raises a worry, such as what if 
a lot of people are made happy by killing you without your consent? We judge that this is 
wrong and we use this judgement when evaluating the theory. But when evaluating a moral 
theory, should we pay attention to all moral judgments or only some? In this paper, I wish to 
present an outline of a paradox related to this question. 
The much cited philosopher John Rawls says that we should only pay attention to the 
ones which he calls “considered moral judgments”: 
So far, though, I have not said anything about considered judgments. Now, as 
already suggested, they enter as those judgments in which moral capacities are 
most likely to be displayed without distortion. Thus in deciding which of our 
judgments to take into account we may reliably select some and exclude others. 
For example, we may discard those judgments made with hesitation, or in which 
we have little confidence. Similarly, those given when we are upset or 
frightened, or when we stand to gain one way or the other can be left aside. All 
these judgments are likely to be erroneous or to be influenced by an excessive 
attention to our own interests. (1999: 42) 
I shall focus on hesitant moral judgments. Imagine a large consistent set of moral judgments 
which are made in hesitant states of mind, but not in whatever state Rawls prefers to take moral 
judgments from, and let us grant that any given hesitant judgment is likely to be erroneous. 
Given Rawls’s recommendations, you can therefore set aside judgment 1 as likely to be 
erroneous, judgment 2, judgment 3, and so forth. So you can set aside the whole set of these 
hesitant moral judgments. 
Now to generate a paradox, of the kind I have in mind, we need some reason to think 
that this set is nevertheless likely to contain a true judgment, somewhere within it. That would 
mean that when focusing on any one judgment from the set you can say that this one is not 
likely to be true, but it does not follow that you can ignore the whole set, contrary to Rawls. If 
a moral theory does not fit with the whole set, then there is probably a problem. Here then is 
something he overlooks. Sometimes one hesitates precisely because one’s moral capacities are 
working with a high degree of sensitivity. Choice A is slightly better than choice B but the 
difference is small enough that one hesitates. One’s hesitation reflects sensitivity rather than 
capacities that are displaying themselves with distortion. That gives us some reason not to 
ignore the whole set. It is as if you have all the tickets to a large lottery: each one is unlikely to 
be the winner, but given the aim of winning, do not discard the whole lot. 
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